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BOOK REVIEWS
What Has Modem Literary Theory to
Offer Law?
Richard A. Posner*
LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW. By Guyora Bindert and Robert
Weisbergt. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2000. 544 pp. $24.95.
The title of this review is the question that the authors of Literary
Criticisms of Law set out to answer in more than 500 pages of tightly packed
print dense with learning. Although critical of much of modem literary
theory, the authors conclude that it is a potentially rich resource for leftist
critique of law. Many readers who slog through to the end of this fatiguingly
long book will answer my question differently: "Nothing."
I think it is accurate to term the type of legal scholarship that this book
represents decadent in the sense in which some of the literature and art of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century were termed decadent. That is, it
is intricate, subtle, ornate, self-indulgent, and disdainful of utility.
(Remember what Oscar Wilde said in the preface to The Picture of Dorian
Gray, that classic specimen offin de si~cle decadence: "There is no such
thing as a moral or an immoral book. Books are well written, or badly
written. That is all."') Despite appearances, I am not being critical in calling
Binder and Weisberg's book decadent. There is nothing wrong with
decadent writing in the sense just described; it is an important genre of
nineteenth-centuryfin de sijcle art and literature, and now that anotherfin de
si~cle has rolled round, a revival is welcome. I am identifying a genre, not
condemning it. The authors are fascinated by, and minutely examine, a set
of scholarly literatures that have no practical significance for law; some of
them are not about law at all. The book has no pedagogic function or
potential that I can see, will be inaccessible by reason of its length and its
* Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of
Chicago Law School. I thank Anne Coughlin for her helpful comments on an earlier draft.
t. Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
t. Edwin E. Huddleson, Jr., Professor of Law, Stanford University.
I. OSCAR WILDE, THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY 5 (Wordsworth Classics 1992) (1908).
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heavy weight of erudition2 to all but the tiniest sliver of the legal profession
(even to most other law professors), and contains nothing that could be used
to understand or improve the law-in part because it doesn't (except very
sporadically) discuss law, or for that matter literature, but instead confines
itself to the scholarly literatures on these subjects. The authors evidently
have different interests, Binder in intellectual history and Weisberg in
literary theory, and their interests are imperfectly melded (that is another of
the self-indulgent features of the book). None of which is meant to deny that
Literary Criticisms of Law is an interesting book. It contains many shrewd
and even pungent passages, and at least one first-rate chapter (chapter 3, on
narrative).
To understand what the authors are about, it is necessary to distinguish
between two different ways in which the law might be approached as a
subject of literary criticism.3 The first and more straightforward would be to
analyze legal texts, such as statutes, wills, contracts, briefs, and judicial
opinions (the most obvious candidate, given the literary distinction of some
of our famous judges) as if they were literary texts. The imagery, narrative
techniques, character portrayal, voice, tone, and other literary properties
would be studied, compared, assessed. The focus would be on the text rather
than on the theoretical apparatus that the analyst brought to it. The analysis
would be "literary" only in paying close attention to the features of the legal
text that a literary critic would attend to in a work of imaginative literature.4
That is not the way of Binder and Weisberg. They are not interested in
legal texts as such. They are interested in "the law" at a high level of
abstraction-namely law as a "cultural activity" and "a process of meaning
making."s One wouldn't expect a working literary critic to have much to say
about law so conceived; it invites theoretical reflection, and for guidance the

2. As where we are told, in a discussion of Wilhelm Dilthey's hermeneutic theory, that
"Simmel and Weber [were] influenced by two rival, neo-Kantian theorists of the
Geisteswissenschaften,Heinrich Rickert and Wilhelm Windelband." P. 126, n.50.
3. 1am not talking, as the authors do not talk, about the depiction of law in literature.
4. See, for an effort at such analysis, Richard A. Posner, Judges' Writing Styles (And Do They
Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421 (1995) (distinguishing style from other literary concepts and
associating judicial writing style with jurisprudential stances), and RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND
LITERATURE 255-302 (revis. and enlarged ed. 1998) ("Judicial Opinions as Literature"). Binder
and Weisberg appear to be unaware of the 1998 edition of Law and Literature, though it was
published two years before their own book. They cite only the first edition, from 1988, which they
describe inaccurately as a "polemic" against law and literature scholarship rather than as an attempt
to contribute to that scholarship; it is both, as indeed is their book. The first edition of my book, in
Part II, covers some, and the 1998 edition, in Parts 11and III, covers much of the same ground
traversed by Binder and Weisberg's book, though more briefly and with different emphases.
Another book that overlaps theirs, but it could not have been cited because it was published even
more recently than theirs, is ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW

110-216 (2000).
5. P. ix.
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authors turn to modem literary theory rather than to practical literary
criticism.
Many readers Will question both the focus and the instrument. Although
law can certainly be described as a cultural activity, it is not obvious that this
is a useful description. It invites the question: So what? Every human
practice can be so describcd. And if the "so what" question can be answered
(Binder and Weisberg do not try), still there are many perspectives from
which to study cultural activity, and it is not obvious that literary theory is
among the more promising. Modem literary theory involves a turning away
from the classic works of literature to texts and practices (called "texts"
also-everything is a text to today's literary theorists) that provide easier
vehicles for making political points, invariably of a left-wing cast (though
many of them contingently, not inherently, so) but decked out in a forbidding
vocabulary drawn from a kaleidoscope of overlapping theories that go by
such names as deconstruction,
structuralism, poststructuralism,
multiculturalism, hermeneutics, queer theory, postcolonialist theory,
subaltern studies, reader response, reception theory, and the new historicism.
These theories in their number and famously obscure jargon place a barrier
rather than a magnifying lens between the literary scholar and the work of
literature. They offend activists by channeling left-wing intellectual energies
into politically inert obscurantism and faculty intrigue, and by inviting
through their excesses right-wing ridicule that resonates with the general
public and so pushes the intellectual Left further to the margin. Because
postmodernist professors of literary and cultural studies "no longer think of
themselves as citizens of a functioning democracy, they are producing a
generation of radical students who think of 'the system' as irredeemable, and
who therefore can think of nothing better to do with their sense of moral
outrage than to fling themselves into curricular change."6 To be of any
practical use, leftist intellectuals must "giv[e] up the claim that philosophical
or literary sophistication is important because it prepares us for the crucial,
socially indispensable role that history has allotted to us-the role of 'critic
of ideology."'7 "'On every campus ... there is one department whose name
need only be mentioned to make people laugh....' [E]veryone knows that
if you want to locate the laughingstock on your local campus these days,
your best bet is to stop by the English department."8

6. Richard Rorty, Intellectualsin Politics: Too FarIn? Too FarOut?, DIssENT, Fall 1991, at
483,489-90.
7. Richard Rorty, The End of Leninism and History as Comic Frame, in HISTORY AND THE
IDEA OF PROGRESS 211, 223 (Arthur M. Melzer, Jerry Weinberger, & M. Richard Zinman eds.,
1995).
8. Andrew Delbanco, The Declineand Fall ofLiterature,N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 4, 1999, at
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The theory-mongering that is making laughingstocks of English
departments is not an auspicious starting point for the study of law as a
cultural activity. I think that Binder and Weisberg know this, for much of
what they discuss under the rubric of literary theory is not modem, or is not
literary theory at all, but instead belongs to history or to jurisprudence.
When they do discuss modem literary theory they are critical (they explain in
the introduction that the Romantic and Victorian conceptions of literature
create the risk that literary theories will be sentimental, skeptical, or
authoritarian), except for the new historicism, which is their preferred theory.
But they are unable to identify any practical benefits that the legal system
might derive from that or any other literary theory.
The book is divided into six very long chapters, each purportedly
devoted to a different genre of literary criticism of law: interpretation,
hermeneutics (viewed as a particular style of interpretation), narrative,
rhetoric, deconstruction, and new historicism, or, the authors' preferred term,
"cultural criticism." Each chapter reviews the history of its subject and
summarizes the views of each of the principal theorists in a page or a few
pages. So in eight pages on "The Hermeneutic Tradition" we zip from
Schleiermacher to Dilthey to Nietzsche to Imgarden (taken out of
chronological order) to Heidegger.9 The summaries seem accurate, so far as
I can judge, and give the book value as a reference work, but reading them
consecutively, like counting beads on a string, is tedious.
The first chapter, on interpretation, is not about literary theory at all,
which means that the book really doesn't get going until page 112, the first
page of the second chapter. Interpretation is something literary critics do, of
course, but they are not the only ones. Anyone whose business is with the
meaning of (or to be given) old, difficult, obscure, or ambiguous texts is
compelled to engage in interpretation. The anyone includes judges asked to
apply our eighteenth-century Constitution, or one of the later amendments, or
a statute, or a regulation, or a contract, or a doctrine stated in previous
judicial opinions. It is possible, though I am doubtful,o that judges and
lawyers engaged in legal interpretation can benefit from the sustained
attention that literary theorists and critics have given to the problems of
interpreting literary texts. But that is not the question broached in chapter 1,
which is instead a history of theories of legal interpretation. All the familiar
figures are here, from Edward Coke and Francis Lieber to James Bradley
Thayer and Oliver Wendell Holmes and Learned Hand and Edward Levi and
Alexander Bickel, with the curious exception that none of the modem
originalists, such as Bork, Scalia, and Easterbrook, are discussed (Bork
9. Pp. 123-31.
10. See POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 4, at 209-54 (analyzing different schools
of literary theory and their potential applicability to legal interpretation).

Oct. 2000]

MODERALITERARY THEORY

receives a passing mention). This is a clue that the authors are writing for
and within the left intelligentsia.
The authors' principal effort in chapter 1, to tie the history of legal
interpretation to literary theory, is lame. It is in fact a mere play on words:
Theorists of liberal interpretation as opposed to strict interpretation, such as
Cardozo, emphasized the "creative" function of the judge, even called what
they did "art" rather than "science." Literary or artistic creativity is not the
only kind of creativity, and when judges describe interpretation as art rather
than science all they mean is that interpretation is not algorithmic, as
interpretive formalists believe. As a modem judge, I am duly flattered to see
the modem judge described as "a moral artist ...exemplifying the artistic
virtues of nonconformity, independence, and integrity,"' but these are not
virtues peculiar to writers or other artists, and the possession of them does
not make a judge's opinions works of literature. It is meaningless to say as
the authors also do that "the judge, like the modem literary author, was
expected to provide charismatic moral leadership."12 Not only is that a
curious description of what is expected of modem writers, but it assumes
away nonliterary providers of charismatic moral leadership, such as Martin
Luther King, Jr. Would a judge who (improbably) modeled himself on King
necessarily be embracing a literary conception of law? "Art" and "literature"
are being used here as honorifics.
On the very next page, ushering in the chapter on hermeneutics, the
authors, embroidering the metaphor of the "judicial artist," tell us that
modem American law requires "a judicial artist with the skills of a literary
critic."13 It is unclear whether possession of those skills marks a judge as a
judicial artist or whether they are a supplement to the supposedly artistic
virtues described in the first chapter. In any event, chapter 2 is about the
schools of interpretation that emphasize the reader's role in determining the
meaning of a text. These schools include the German hermeneutic tradition,
which, like theories of interpretation generally, was not limited to, or even
primarily concerned with, literary texts. But the interpretive schools
discussed in this chapter also include the newer "reader response" school of
interpretation, which is more specifically literary and which the authors
naturally associate primarily with Stanley Fish, a literary critic and theorist
who writes about law as well as literature. Fish, and a number of left-leaning
law professors such as Sanford Levinson, Owen Fiss, and Mark Tushnet, do
not think that the words of a text can determine its meaning; other sources
for stabilizing meaning must be sought. The Constitution provides that the
President must be at least thirty-five years old, and this seems clear enough,
II.P.111.
12. P. 93.
13. P. 112.
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but it is clear only by virtue of such taken-for-granted practices as keeping
reliable records of dates of birth and using numbers to denote precise
quantities rather than, as the ancient Greeks did, relative magnitudes.14
Binder and Weisberg infer from such examples that interpretation cannot be
just of a text, but must be of its cultural context as well. Which is to say that
all the world's a text, and the cultural critic's potential reach vast: "[A]
genuinely hermeneutic criticism would have to interpret and evaluate law as
part of a larger culture. In our final chapter we will propose such a Cultural
Criticism of Law."l5 Again they are playing with words. The fact that
interpretation of a text requires consideration of contextual factors does not
mean that it is no longer just the text that's being interpreted. The text's
cultural surround may or may not require interpretation too.
Despite the references to formalist (mainly New Critical) and readerresponse literary theorists, most of the theorists discussed in this chapter are
philosophers or law professors, with only the apparent exception of Stanley
Fish, who writes as a philosopher in the debate over legal interpretation. The
law professors occasionally invoke literature or literary theory, but the
invocations are ornamental. Eager to tie the book's theoretical meander back
to literature from time to time, Binder and Weisberg devote particular
attention to Ronald Dworkin's analogy of constitutional interpretation to
writing a chain novel. There are a number of objections to the analogy,16 but
the one most pertinent to the theme of this review is that it functions as a
metaphor rather than as a serious invocation of literary theory or practice.
Dworkin is not interested in chain novels. Nor, for that matter, are literary
theorists and critics; for there are no good chain novels-they are merely a
curiosity, a parlor game. Dworkin's analogy is just a vivid way of making
the point that judges are constrained by past decisions in a way that
legislators are not.
The authors are not enthusiastic about hermeneutic criticism of law.
They argue that the fact that the words of a legal text may not constrain does
not make interpretation a free-for-all. The example of the age thirty-five
provision of the Constitution makes this clear. So the "indeterminacy" of the
text viewed in isolation from its cultural surround does not, as other leftleaning legal hermeneuticists believe, open the door to "progressive"
interpretation; that door can be opened only by "progressive" interpretation
of the surround when the surround is unclear. This is a valid point, and the
project of chapter 6. But it doesn't follow, as the authors suggest, that
literary criticism must become cultural criticism. Maybe literary criticism
should stick closely to the text, as New Critics and other formalist critics
14. See POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 4, at 220.

15. P. 200.
16. See POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 4, at 246-47.

Oct. 2000]

MODERNLITERARY THEORY

believe, and leave the illumination of the social context to historians and
sociologists.
Chapter 3, which deals with narrative, comes closest to presenting a
meaningful application of literary theory to law. Literary theorists and critics
have said a lot of interesting things about narrative techniques in literature,
and most works of literature have a narrative structure. But so, for that
matter, do many "works" of law-trials, for example, and constitutional
doctrine, which is often presented as a narrative of the growth of concepts of
liberty or equality. Good lawyers understand intuitively the importance to
success in litigation of being able to tell a good story, but they are not selfconscious about the narrative element in law, and so perhaps can learn
something from the literary narratologists.
The chapter contains a very thorough, very helpful discussion of what
literary critics have said about the function, structure, and politics of
narrative. It also contains some properly critical remarks on "victim
narratives"-the personal, often autobiographical stories of discrimination
and oppression that are the hallmark of the "critical race theory" branch of
legal scholarship and of much feminist writing both inside and outside of
law. Binder and Weisberg argue persuasively that there is nothing inherently
edifying about narrative and no incompatibility between narrative and
analysis. Narratives can be accurate and insightful, but they can also be
misleading and obtuse. And narratives frame or are framed by analysis.
Discussing several edifying examples of law-related narrative, including a
study of "battered women's" stories that surprisingly concludes that
"[v]ictims of domestic abuse are not passive and helpless, but insubordinate
and indomitable,"17 Binder and Weisberg observe that "[tihese texts achieve
their subversive effect not by opposing reason with experience, but by
offering reasons to replace one narrative 'construction' of experience with
another." 8 But they don't consider the possibility that conservative
narratives, for example of affirmative action and political correctness, might
be equally redescriptive and "subversive" in the opposite direction. Nor are
they forthright in confronting the issue of truthfulness presented by such
notable "victim narratives" as Patricia Williams's Alchemy of Race and
Rights, which they discuss admiringly and at length.19
The chapter also contains a worthwhile discussion at my expense of
Robin West's comparison of me to Kafka.20 West had argued that the
characters in Kafka's fictions are parodic versions of "economic man" that
17. P. 245.

IS. Id.
19. Pp. 257-60; see also PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS:

DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR (1991), discussed in RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 36884(1995).

20. Pp. 284-87.
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demonstrate the factual and moral inadequacy of economic models of human
behavior.21 Although Binder and Weisberg have room for so much else,
even for Rickert and Windelband,22 they do not find room to mention my
criticisms of West's interpretations both of Kafka and of economic theory.23
But they are right that her take of Kafka and mine on economics are
alternative ways of "narrating" law, hers a narrative in which the central
characters are Kafka's "hapless schlemiels anxious to salvage their bourgeois
dignity by consenting to their own discontents,"24 and mine consisting of
robust clear-eyed rational maximizers of their own satisfactions.5 Binder
and Weisberg make a better case than West that "Kafka's fiction is not
only," as I had argued, "about interior despair but also about the social world
that helps create it."26 I had already made a bow in this direction in my
discussion in the second edition of my book of Kafka's great story "The
Metamorphosis," 27 but the authors are not aware of the second edition and if
they were they would regard the bow as too slight. They may be correct.
In chapter 4 the authors take up rhetorical literary criticism. "Rhetoric" is
a maddeningly elusive term.2 8 In one sense it just means style, and when it is
so understood rhetorical criticism is coextensive with formalistic criticism.
In a more influential sense, that of Aristotle, rhetoric means the methods of
rational persuasion suitable to areas in which exact methods of inquiry, such
as mathematics and logic (today one would add scientific experimentation),
are unavailable. In a still broader sense, one that has commended itself to
some modem literary critics such as Wayne Booth, and to James Boyd
White, one of the founders of the law and literature movement, it refers to
edifying discourse, discourse that preserves and enhances culture and
decency, as distinct from the antiseptic and (as White certainly sees it)
sinister prose of the social scientist.

21. Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and
Political Visions of Franz Kaflka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985). West uses
Kafka's depictions of human motivation to dispute my claim that wealth-maximizing transactions
promote well-being and autonomy.
22. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
23. See POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 4 at 182-205. The authors' second
thumbnail characterization of my book--"its ultimate point is to defend market-oriented legal
thought against West's literary reading," p. 285-is no more accurate than the first (a polemic
against law and literature scholarship); but it is a characteristic of chapter 6 of my book, the chapter
on Kafka and West. See POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 4, at 182-205.
24. P. 285.
25. The suggestion that economic analysis of law is an unrealistically optimistic narrative has
been made before, notably by Arthur Leff. Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some
Realism about Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv. 451,452 (1974).
26. P. 287.
27. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 4, at 186.
28. See id. at 255-56.
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In perhaps the best discussion in the book, Binder and Weisberg explain
that the followers of Leo Strauss, including Allan Bloom, the author of the
bestselling The Closing of the American Mind,29 though they consider
themselves philosophers and political theorists, are in fact "conservative
rhetoricians," whose position the authors summarize as follows:
Conservative rhetoricians oppose classical thought to modem thought, and so
oppose rhetoric to both the subjectivism of Romantic literature and the
objectivism of science....

...[They] apparently adhere to a classical metaphysics made up of natural
wholes, classes, and values. Yet it is not always clear whether they believe that
this metaphysics is true or merely that it is useful to the maintenance of

desirable forms of social authority.
Conservative rhetoricians present themselves as open-minded pluralists,
seeking to make room for classical ideas in modem debate rather than to replace
modem ideas. Yet this position may simply reflect an effort to exploit the
vulnerabilities of liberal ideas like value relativism, value neutrality, and
tolerance. And it may reflect the awareness of these rhetoricians that classical
ideas are unlikely to prevail with the general public in a modem liberal state. In
any case, their teachings are not primarily directed at the public but at
intellectual and political elites.
..
Conservative rhetoricians place relatively little value on candor, which
they associate with incontinent self-revelation and an irresponsible disregard for
how information may be misused.
•.. [They] see themselves as a relatively powerless intellectual elite.., that
must ally with and civilize other sources of political power in order to conserve
itself and its values.
*.. [They] see the structure of rhetorical discourse as hierarchical. For those
interlocutors unfit for initiation into wisdom, rhetoric serves to deceive and
mollify. For those fit for instruction, rhetoric is a pedagogic.... A lengthy,
suspenseful, and eroticized process of initiation serves to confirm the
charismatic authority of the teachers and to socialize the pupils to deference and
30
patience.

This seems to me just right. There is only one problem. Binder and
Weisberg's analysis of Straussian political theory as conservative rhetoric
has naught to do with either law or literary criticism. If there are any
Straussian judges or law professors, Binder and Weisberg are not telling, and
their skillful anatomizing of Straussian theory owes nothing that I can see to
either literary criticism or literary theory. It is an example, their wonderful
excursus on the Straussians, of the self-indulgent character of the book. It is
a compendium of the authors' thoughts rather than a disciplined analysis of a
29. Seepp. 321-22.
30. Pp. 329-30.
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subfield of law and literature. No more than half the book is within yards of
the intersection of law and literature.
I have not done with chapter 4. The authors, here repeating an earlier
and unusual claim in the book that Alexander Bickel was a principal
forerunner of the law and literature movement, say that he believed that the
only way to meet the crisis as the authors see it of the Constitution's failure
to speak clearly to modem issues of race relations was "through ever greater
artifice and ever more subtle aesthetic vision."31 Specifically, "[his] method
was rhetorical in the sense that it combined prudential reason with
eloquence, in that it aimed at reaffirming the normative basis of social
solidarity, and in that it aimed at modeling the political virtues of restraint,
forbearance, and commitment to deliberative dialogue."32 Here "rhetorical"
is being used in an unhelpfully broad sense, but on the next page the authors
explain that Bickel, adopting Hamilton's description of the judiciary as "the
least dangerous branch"33 of the federal government, believed that the role of
the judiciary was "to lead by persuasion, not coercion, and by example rather
than regulation."34 This is fine, but it is the beginning rather than the end of
rhetorical criticism. The judiciary's role having been defined as leadership
by persuasion and example rather than by force and precept, the critic would
be expected to take over and explain how that role is best played in dealing
with specific constitutional issues, such as abortion, school prayer, and
affirmative action. But that is not attempted and the authors veer off into a
discussion of Lincoln's politics of prudence.
They come back, though, to James Boyd White, who "conceives rhetoric
as restorative ....The aesthetic vision animating this view of literary art is
the New Critical 'tolerance of ambivalence ...
"353. The authors are
skeptical:
White's literary rhetoric aims to evoke in the hearer an attitude of devotion to

principle, an attitude that might be jeopardized by confrontation with any
particularprinciple.... Passions will be sublimated in art, and opponents will
be soothed by the complex symmetry of the discursive world they make

together.

Aesthetic self-discipline will replace moral self-discipline, and

righteous indignation will give way before gracious gestures.36

This is a fair summary, and a damaging one.
The authors end up criticizing both conservative and liberal versions of
rhetoric, and, again pointing forward to their last chapter, urge "equat[ing]

31. P. 310.

32. Id. (emphasis inoriginal).
33. They seem to think it Bickel's coinage. P. 311.
34. Id.
35. P. 352.

36. P. 353 (emphases in original).
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37
rhetoric with the performance and criticism of culture." Why they think it
helpful to retain the word "rhetoric" is unclear.
In the penultimate chapter the authors take up what they call
deconstructive criticism of law. The word "deconstruction" is (properly)
used in at least two distinct senses. One, the easier to grasp, is as a style of
textual interpretation far wilder than anything dreamed of by the New Critics
but recognizable as an extension of the New Criticism by its fascination with
the extravagant ambiguities of meaning that emerge when a text is inspected
minutely, obsessively, with little regard for stabilizing contextual features.
This meaning of deconstruction has obvious if unacceptable implications for
legal interpretation,38 because fixity of meaning is necessary to minimize
legal uncertainty and cabin judicial discretion. Binder and Weisberg are less
interested in deconstruction as an interpretive technique than in
deconstruction as an ontological stance that they deem reactionary because it
implies (and in Derrida expresses) criticism of participatory democracy.
Common sense tells us that speech is a more reliable, in a sense more
"basic," method of communication than writing because it is immediate,
because it enables meaning to be clarified by inflection and body language
and by interrogating the speaker, and because the speaker knows who his
"reader" (that is, listener) is and can fit his words to the listener's
understanding. At the opposite extreme is a document written for one
purpose centuries or even millennia ago and read today for another purpose
by people culturally as well as temporally remote from the writer-the Iliad,
for example. Derrida opposes the privileging of speech over writing and
finds it exemplified in radical politics, where new meanings and identities
are forged in meetings, rallies, and other communal projects that bring
people face to face with each other.
This analysis of Derrida's political philosophy is very interesting but its
connection to either law or literature is tenuous. After thirty pages on
Derrida the authors turn to legal radicals ("crits"), such as Duncan Kennedy,
who the authors believe misunderstand deconstruction as licensing
epistemological skepticism. The crits think the arguments that lawyers make
and that judges purport to base decisions on do no actual work because every
legal argument implies its opposite. In showing this the crits say they are
"deconstructing" the legal process. (Here "deconstruction" becomes close to
a synonym for "destruction.") Binder and Weisberg argue that the crits
mistakenly believe that deconstruction is skeptical, whereas actually it is
pragmatic; and "skepticism presumes that epistemological foundations must
be established for knowledge to be legitimate," while "pragmatism presumes

37. P. 377.
38. See POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 4, at 211-16, 219-20, 234-36.

206
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that because such foundations cannot be established they cannot be
necessary."39
At the end of the chapter the authors give a helpful preview of their own
preferred approach, "cultural criticism". It means applying
literary analysis to the drama of particular legal disputes and legal
transformations, to better understand what is truly at stake. Whether we are
bent on describing normative conflict or prescribing its solution, we will do
better if we understand that it is the very identities of the participants that are at
issue. 40
The key words are "drama" and "identities," as we see most clearly in a
vignette in the final chapter. The authors are describing a book that contains
a chapter about the trial of Abbie Hoffman and other radicals (the "Chicago
Seven") on charges growing out of the riots at the 1968 Democratic
convention in Chicago. At the trial Hoffman "broadly played the shtetldweller, just off the boat."41 The judge, also named Hoffman, and also
Jewish, was an elderly man, a Republican, of exaggerated formality, and in
fact a courtroom martinet. Abbie Hoffman "placed Judaism on both sides of
the civilization divide... [b]y calling public attention to Judge Hoffman's
Jewishness";42 thus showing, among other things, that "Judge Hoffman was
not simply striving to 'pass' but was actually collaborating in the persecution
of his own people."43 Binder and Weisberg offer this analysis as an example
of how we can read a trial "to discover the social forms, rituals, and
mechanisms of meaning that underlie its apparent function."44 The trial of
the Chicago Seven, conceived as a literary text, was not about whether Abbie
Hoffman and the other defendants had committed crimes but about
"exposing the soiled undergarments of civilization-its sexuality,
materiality, savagery."45
This is an outrg, even a bathetic, example ("soiled undergarments"). The
other examples that embellish this final chapter are no more representative of
the normal operation of the legal system-a war crimes trial, the medieval
Icelandic revenge system, an Indian tribal trial, and the trial of John Brown.
The quirky choice of examples illustrates the self-indulgent tone of the book.
The chapter culminates in an aesthetic analysis of capitalism. The authors
argue that to make capitalism work, society had to invent new "characters"
39. P.461.
40. Id. The authors do not mention in this connection Paul Kahn, the most programmatic
advocate of a "cultural studies" approach to law. See PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF
LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (1999). Maybe Kahn's book was published too late
for Binder and Weisberg to cite it.
41. P. 482.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. P. 481.
45. P. 482.
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(in the literary sense) for merchants, creditors, financiers, and other key
actors in a capitalist society who had been despised in the Middle Ages. This
is a good point; and the literary depiction of the transition from medieval to
capitalistic values is well captured in The Merchant of Venice,46 which the
authors do not discuss. The authors are after bigger game, arguing among
other things that
the corporation represents the eternal capitalist life, the form of commerce that

transcends the vagaries of commerce....
The corporation is a figure of ravenous desire, conceived as a mere agent of
distribution but ending up as the great consumer of value. It is the answer to the
wonderful question of capitalism that [Walter Benn] Michaels poses: How do
rich people who seem to have all that a person could want manage to keep on
wanting? A person has to have a limited body and hence a limited appetite, but
the corporation can transcend these limits. Just as the corporation, saviorlike,
takes upon itself the liability of its investors, it also takes on their desires and
47
keeps them safe from satiation.

These are wild and whirling words, behind which lurks a Depression-era
fear of overproduction-a theme of another literary work that Binder and
Weisberg do not discuss, Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, and of 1950sstyle sociologists such as David Riesman, Daniel Bell, and Richard Sennett.
Capitalism is too efficient: It spews out products in such abundance as to
threaten disaster, as in the story of the Sorcerer's Apprentice. Society casts
about frantically for methods of sopping up the excess production, as by
turning the citizen into an avid consumer or creating an artificial person, the
corporation, to store goods forever. Yet disaster is always lurking just
around the comer for the capitalist, and so, the authors argue, rich people
collect art because its permanence acts as a hedge against the inherent
insecurity of capitalist enterprise.
I leave the reader to evaluate the cogency of this conception of
capitalism. I want to make three points that will bring this review to a close.
First, the project of "cultural criticism" described at considerable length in
this final chapter is ostentatiously marginal to any serious interest in the
American legal system. Second, if it has implications that I have missed for
the "progressive" politics that cultural criticism of law is supposed to serve,
the authors do not describe any. And third, it is all secondhand. Because the
authors do not apply their conception of cultural criticism to particular trials,
doctrines, or institutions, but merely paraphrase the applications of other
scholars, such as the new-historicist literary theorist Walter Berm Michaels
talking about the corporation, the reader cannot tell whether there is anything
distinctive or original in their approach. This is not to deny that their

46. See POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 4, at 107-08, 189.
47. P. 531 (citations omitted).

208

STANFORD LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 53:195

paraphrases are skillful and helpful to anyone who wants help in
understanding modem literary theory.
I hope I have given an adequate sense in a reasonable compass of the
scope and thrust of the book, and of its strengths and weaknesses. Its
strengths are its many penetrating criticisms, of which I have been able to
give only a glimpse. Its weaknesses are its inordinate length and
promiscuous breadth, its failure to define and organize a subject, and its lack
of a constructive aspect, a lack shown most dramatically by the authors'
failure to redeem the promise-held tantalizingly before us, just out of reach,
in the earlier chapters-of illumination through "cultural criticism."

